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ABSTRACT  
While the Philippines and China declared 2012 and 2013 as years of 
friendly exchanges between the two countries, they are currently at 
odds with each other due to continuing sovereignty disputes in the 
South China Sea. China’s growing maritime capability, a result of the 
implementation of its current naval strategy, creates security 
anxieties in the Philippines.  These security anxieties affect the 
present dynamics in Philippines-China relations.  In the context of 
the South China Sea Disputes, the Philippines and China are now 
suffering a security dilemma, a tragic situation that creates enmity 
rather than amity in their relations. With their security dilemma, the 
Philippines and China are presently trapped in a “guessing game” 
situation, speculating on each other’s strategic intention. Finding 
ways to ameliorate this security dilemma is essential for both 
countries to promote cooperation rather than competition in their 
overall relationship. 
Keywords:  China’s naval strategy, security dilemma, South China Sea 
dispute, Philippines-China relations 
 
* This lecture was delivered on July 26, 2012 at the Ateneo de Manila University Ricardo 
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ince the 10th century, the Philippines and China have enjoyed 
very close, peaceful, and friendly relations.  But the start of the 
21st century puts their friendly relations in a very challenging 
situation because of existing differences on how to peacefully 
resolve their territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 
During the official state visit of President Benigno Simeon 
Aquino III to China on 31 August 2011, both countries declared 
“2012-2013” as the “Philippines-China Years of Friendly 
Exchanges” (Banlaoi, 2012, pp. 175-177). However, the standoff in 
the Scarborough Shoal that started on 10 April 2012 and the 
continuing disagreements on how to peacefully solve the South 
China Sea problem prevented both countries from implementing 
their friendly exchanges. Instead, the two countries exchanged 
diplomatic protests and harsh media commentaries against each 
other, putting their bilateral relations in a very sour state during 
the whole year of 2012. 
For 2013, there has been an attempt to renew friendly 
exchanges between the two countries by setting aside their 
sovereignty claims in order to de-escalate existing territorial 
conflicts in the South China Sea.  However, China’s already grown 
maritime capability, resulting from the decisive implementation of 
its current naval strategy in the South China Sea, makes it utterly 
difficult for the Philippines to just sweep the South China Sea issue 
under the rug. The Philippines wants an immediate peaceful 
resolution of the South China Sea dispute because of its urgent 
need to develop the resources in its maritime domain for its 
national economic development. 
For China, on the other hand, the South China Sea is also 
important for economic, political and strategic reasons.  Security 
concerns in the South China Sea affect China’s core interests that 
define its foreign relations with other countries.  Though China 
has a strong willingness to shelve sovereignty issues in the South 
China Sea, there is domestic pressure in China to use its present 
S
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naval power in order to protect the country’s national interests in 
this disputed body of water. 
This paper argues that the implementation of China’s naval 
strategy in the South China Sea poses a maritime security dilemma 
in Philippines-China relations.  Overcoming this maritime security 
dilemma is essential to improve the current state in their bilateral 
ties. 
Security dilemma:  A framework of analysis1 
Security dilemma is an excellent framework to analyze the 
present dynamics in Philippines-China security relations, 
particularly in the context of China’s implementation of its naval 
strategy in the South China Sea. Security dilemma inevitably exists 
when military preparations of one state unnecessarily create an un-
resolvable uncertainty in the mind of another state as to whether 
those preparations are for “defensive” or “offensive” purposes 
(Wheeler & Booth, 1992). 
With the general concept of security dilemma, the Philippines 
and China are inevitably trapped in a difficult “guessing game” 
situation where they desperately speculate on each other’s strategic 
intention, whether it is benign or malign.  States’ perceptions of 
security dilemma create a great paradox where states arguably 
believe that their security requires the unintended insecurities of 
others (Snyder, 1985). 
This very difficult situation undesirably occurs because of the 
anarchic nature of international system where there is the utter  
absence of an overarching central authority that can effectively 
regulate and even tame the behavior of self-seeking sovereign states 
whose preoccupation is self-preservation and survival.   
In an anarchic international environment, states constantly 
compete with one another to protect their highly cherished 
sovereignty and to pursue their deeply valued national interests.2  
Though the state of anarchy can also encourage and motivate states  
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to cooperate by building international regimes or constructing 
international norms necessary for international stability, mutual 
suspicions arguably continue to define the reality of international 
politics.  
These mutual suspicions create an “action-reaction” dynamics 
that breed more feelings of insecurities. No matter how states 
convince their neighbors that they are benign, mutual suspicions 
unleash a sinister perspective that a benign status can change to a 
malign situation.   This undesirable malign condition creates 
enmity rather than amity between states. 
Thus, security dilemma is a great tragedy because small armed 
conflicts or a full-scale war can possibly occur between and among 
states though none of them actually desire such an unintended 
tragic outcome (Butterfield, 1951).  Because each state is mandated 
to pursue its own national interests, security uncertainties pervade 
in the relations among states. These uncertainties also create 
security anxieties that in turn exacerbate the security dilemma.   
The principle of security dilemma can describe the present 
complex dynamics of Philippines-China relations in the South 
China Sea.3 The Philippines and China (as well as other claimants) 
are strongly driven by their desire to vigorously protect their 
territorial integrity and advance their national sovereignty in this 
highly contested body of water.   
Because of conflicting claims that are motivated by sovereignty 
issues, claimants in the South China Sea continue to make 
unilateral moves that aim to strengthen their effective occupation 
of islands, islets, reefs, cays and shoals in the area. The Philippines 
and China are motivated to build and enhance their naval 
capability to protect their respective national security interests in 
the South China Sea. 
China’s naval strategy:  Evolution and current status 
China has an existing naval strategy that aims to regain its past 
glory as one of the world’s pre-eminent sea powers.  The White 
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Paper on China’s Armed Forces published on 16 April 2013 vividly 
articulates China’s strong desire to develop its blue water 
capabilities for purposes of “safeguarding its maritime security and 
maintaining its sovereignty over its territorial seas along with its 
maritime rights and interests.”  China’s most updated defense 
white paper admits that the People’s Liberation Army – Navy 
(PLAN) “has a total strength of 235,000 officers and men, and 
commands three fleets, namely, the Beihai Fleet, the Donghai Fleet 
and the Nanhai Fleet. Each fleet has fleet aviation headquarters, 
support bases, flotillas and maritime garrison commands, as well as 
aviation divisions and marine brigades.”  
As early as the 15th century, in fact, China already possessed a 
naval force that was considered one of the most powerful in the 
world.  Admiral Zheng He (1371-1433) enriched China’s naval 
tradition through his historic voyages.   
China’s current naval strategy aims to address its maritime 
security dilemma as a rapidly growing major power.  Inspired by 
Admiral Zheng’s maritime tradition, this strategy evolves from 
Mao Tse Tung’s modern dictum, “Power grows out of the barrel of 
the gun.”   This principle justifies the arming of China as part of the 
strengthening of its comprehensive national power.  
While building its military capability amidst domestic security 
concerns and external security challenges, the development of 
China’s naval strategy is also guided by the mantra of Deng 
Xiaoping who asserts, “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope 
with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at 
maintaining low profile; and never claim leadership.” 
Based on Mao’s and Deng’s strategic legacies, China has crafted 
a “Blue Water Naval Strategy” that is evolutionary and visionary.  
This strategy was finalized in 1989 when Deng adopted a drastic 
change in foreign policy by opening China to the world.  This 
naval strategy has a 50-year grand plan divided into three phases: 
• First phase 2000 - the PLA shall have acquired sea-
control power within its coastal waters. 
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• Second phase 2010-2020 
achieved a kind of sea-denial capability within its first 
island chain in the West Pacific.
• Third phase 2050 – China shall have become a naval 
power capable of making its presence felt globally 
(You, 2006). 
China already accomplished the first 
capability plan with the establishment of China’s South Sea Fleet 
covering the South China Sea as its area of responsibility.   China 
also has the North Sea Fleet covering the Yellow Sea with 
competing maritime claims with South Korea an
Fleet covering the East China Sea with competing maritime claims 
with Japan. 
 
China’s three fleets 
Source: India Strategic, October 2008.
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The South Sea Fleet in the South China Sea accommodates most 
of the Chinese ships belonging to two major maritime flotillas 
(“China Maritime Surveillance”, 2012): 
• The 7th Maritime Surveillance Flotilla composed of the 
following patrol ships: 
o Zhong Guo Hai Jian 71 
o Zhong Guo Hai Jian 72 
o Zhong Guo Hai Jian 73 
o Zhong Guo Hai Jian 74 
o Zhong Guo Hai Jian 75 
• The 8th Maritime Surveillance Flotilla composed of the 
following patrol ships: 
o Zhong Guo Hai Jian 81 
o Zhong Guo Hai Jian 83 
o Zhong Guo Hai Jian 84 
China also has the 9th Maritime Surveillance Flotilla stationed at 
the South Sea Fleet.  The 9th Flotilla has the Type 052B, a multirole 
missile destroyer built by Jiangnan Shipyard for the PLAN (“Type 
052B / Guangzhou Class,” n.d.). The destroyer is akin to the 
Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyer being armed with two 
missile launchers that can carry a total of 48 missiles.  
Complimenting the South Sea Fleet in Guangzhou is the Sanya 
Submarine Base in Hainan.  This submarine base has a Jin-class 
(Type 094) nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine that China 
secretly launched in July 2004 but was publicly discovered via 
Google Earth in May 2007. The 2012 US Department of Defense 
Report on Chinese military and security developments said that 
this submarine already entered full active service by the PLA Navy.  
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China South Sea fleet 
Source:  PIC.CHINAMIL.COM.CHINA, 2013.
 
Sanya submarine base in Hainan       
Source: Federation of American Scientists
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China is currently implementing the Second Phase of its naval 
capability development.  The PLA Navy is strengthening its 
submarine forces in order to achieve a kind of sea
within its first island chain in the West Pacific.  China has acqu
Kilo class submarines from Russia and has developed its Song class 
and Yuan class submarines.   
China’s submarine fleet 
Source:  China Daily, February 2013.
  
At present, China has at least 60 submarines of various classes 
with growing stealth and increasing firepower capabilities that can 
operate up to 1,000 nautical miles from its coast. If the current 
trend of its naval capability development continues, China
accomplish the objectives of the second phase even before 2020.  
In fact, China already implemented some aspects of the third 
phase with the construction of its first aircraft carrier named 
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“Liaoning.” Lessons from World War II demonstrated the 
deterrent capability of aircraft carriers.   China’s participation in 
the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden was also a litmus 
test of its naval ability to operate globally.  Thus, China can al
accomplish the objective of the third phase ahead of schedule.  
At the opening of the 18th National People’s Congress on 8 
November 2012, past-President Hu Jintao declared China’s 
intention to become a maritime power.  China’s current President 
Xi Jinping, also serving as the Chairman of the China’s Military 
Commission, is poised to pursue this maritime power ambition, 
particularly in the context of renewed security tensions in the 
South China Sea. 
 
China’s aircraft carrier 
Source: Xinhua.net, May 201
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China’s naval strategy and the South China Sea disputes4 
China is vigorously implementing its current naval strategy that 
intends to increase its naval and maritime law enforcement 
capabilities.   This strategy aims to protect its “maritime defense” 
(haifang) and “maritime rights and interests” (haiyang quanyi or 
haiquan) in the South China Sea and other waters in Asia (such as 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island in the East China Sea in conflict with Japan 
and the Yellow Sea in conflict with South Korea).  China regards 
these waters as part its maritime territory.  
The PLA Navy has also flirted with the idea of a new type of 
naval campaign in the South China Sea that encourages “attacks 
against coral islands and reefs” (dui shanhu daojiao jingong 
zhanyi).  Naval experts say that this campaign scenario “appears to 
be tailored to the South China Sea disputes where China might 
consider attacking islands and reefs held by other claimants” 
(Saunder, Yung, Swane, & Nien-Dzu Yang, 2011, p. 50). It is not 
yet clear, however, whether this idea has been adopted as an official 
military campaign strategy of the PLA.  
Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea and the Scarborough 
Shoal do more than fishing.  These fishing activities are integral 
aspects of China’s implementation of its naval strategy.  Fishing 
expeditions “are civilian instruments of power that help stake out 
legal claims and establish national maritime rights” (Cronin, 2012, 
p. 2). 
Thus, the Chinese government protects the fishermen to 
promote its concept of maritime rights and stake out its legal 
maritime claims.  China’s current behavior in the Scarborough 
Shoal is part of this overall power projection.  According to a 
report:   
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Chinese officials are deliberately using civilian 
maritime law-enforcement vessels, rather than the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy—to enforce China’s 
maritime rights and fishing laws. Whereas China 
resorted to using warships over Mischief Reef 
territorial disputes in the 1990s, the recent 
assertiveness of China in these waters has been 
prosecuted largely with civilian instruments of power. 
(p. 3) 
Maritime security dilemma in Philippines-China relations 
The implementation of China’s naval strategy in the South 
China Sea exacerbates the maritime security dilemma in 
Philippines-China relations. For the Philippines, the 
implementation of China’s naval strategy in the South China Sea is 
offensive and threatening.  Its deployment around the South China 
Sea of China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) vessels with maritime 
defense capabilities is flexing China’s military muscles.   For China, 
however, China’s deployment of its CMS vessels in the South 
China is an assertion of its sovereign right to patrol its territorial 
waters for defensive purposes.  In fact, China accuses the 
Philippines for its “illegal occupation” of China’s territories in the 
South China Sea. 
Since the Philippine government does not have the maritime 
capability to match China’s actions in the South China Sea, Manila 
resorted to international arbitration to peacefully settle its 
maritime disputes with Beijing. On 22 January 2013, the Philippine 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) brought the country’s 
maritime claims in the South China Sea before the Arbitral 
Tribunal under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).   
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The DFA also sent a note verbale to Chinese Ambassador to the 
Philippines, Ma Keging. The note verbale contained the 21-page 
notification and statement of claim it submitted for international 
arbitration. The salient points in the notification and statement of 
claim are the following: 
1. The Philippines asserts that China’s so-called nine-dash 
line claim, encompassing virtually the entire South China 
Sea/West Philippine Sea, is contrary to UNCLOS and 
thus unlawful. 
2. Within the maritime area encompassed by the 9-dash 
line, China has also laid claim to, occupied, and built 
structures on certain submerged banks, reefs and low 
tide elevations that do not qualify as islands under 
UNCLOS but are parts of the Philippine continental 
shelf, or the international seabed.   In addition, China has 
occupied certain small, uninhabitable coral projections 
that are barely above water at high tide, and which are 
“rocks” under Article 121 (3) of UNCLOS. 
3. China has interfered with the Philippines’ lawful exercise 
of its rights within its legitimate maritime zones, as well 
as to the aforementioned features and their surrounding 
waters. 
4. The Philippines is conscious of China’s declaration of 25 
August 2006 under Article 298 of UNCLOS (on optional 
exceptions to the compulsory proceedings), and has 
avoided raising subjects or making claims that China has, 
by virtue of that declaration, excluded from arbitral 
jurisdiction. 
Though the Philippines also has the intention of developing a 
“minimum credible defense force,” taking international legal 
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measures is its immediate option to advance its outstanding 
maritime claims in the South China Sea.    
China, however, prefers direct bilateral negotiations. Beijing 
rejects Manila’s option to internationalize the South China Sea 
dispute. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to implement its maritime 
patrols in the disputed waters of the South China Sea to assert its 
sovereignty claims. 
Conclusion 
The Philippines and China are trapped in a maritime security 
dilemma in the South China Sea.  Both countries’ perceptions of 
security uncertainties drive their maritime security dilemma.  This 
maritime security dilemma puts Philippines-China security 
relations in a situation of enmity rather than amity. At present, the 
relations between the two countries are sour. Their bilateral ties are 
at its lowest point. 
But there is a way to overcome the maritime security dilemma.  
Most experts in international relations agree that the way out of 
the security dilemma is through peaceful and open 
communication. Though this is easier said than done, 
communication is essential to build confidence and trust amidst 
the uncertainties in the security environment.    
If the Philippines and China can communicate effectively that 
their intentions are benign to each other, their maritime security 
dilemma in the South China Sea may be overcome.  Thus, both 
countries have to exert their best efforts to open all possible 
channels of communication to ameliorate their dilemma.   
The Philippines and China are friendly neighbors.  Their long-
standing friendship dates back to many centuries of peaceful co-
existence and good neighborliness.   
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However, the complex territorial conflict in the South China Sea 
has affected the further blossoming of their friendship. The South 
China Sea conflict, punctuated by China’s implementation of its 
naval strategy, exacerbates the two countries’ maritime security 
dilemma.   
The South China Sea dispute is just one aspect of Philippines-
China relations.   Both countries have to exert efforts to prevent 
the South China Sea dispute from affecting the over-all 
improvement of their comprehensive bilateral ties. 
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